Encryption
Encryption in Rift was last updated September 2026. The page says it is "written from the code that ships, not a design doc." The client code is not public. This page follows that document.
End to end
- The text of 1:1 direct messages, including edits and formatting.
- Voice, camera, and screen share in a 1:1 DM call, when both clients support it. An older client gets a call the UI marks as plaintext. They say there is no quiet downgrade.
The construction is an X3DH handshake and a Double Ratchet (X25519, HKDF-SHA256, AES-256-GCM). That is the construction Signal publishes. Identity keys are derived from the 12-word Rift Key. The server stores public keys only, and refuses an unsigned identity upload.
Keys Rift holds
The page's short version:
Shard channels, Splinters, and file attachments are encrypted on our servers with keys we hold.
- Shard messages: per-message keys wrapped by a master key Rift holds. The page calls this encryption at rest, aimed at a stolen database. Rift holds that master key and can read those messages.
- Splinters, private group chats of three or more: the same model. The features page says this too.
- Attachments in any conversation, including DMs. "The file bytes, filename, size, and type are visible to our storage layer." Since 15:47 UTC on 3 October 2026 the homepage says DM text is end to end on the device, and that attachments and Shard messages are encrypted at rest.
- Shard voice, and any call that is not a supported 1:1 DM call: "TLS between you and us, plaintext on our media server." They host the media servers and say no third party receives the audio. The server mixes the audio.
For an encrypted DM, the server stores who the two people are, when the conversation started, sender, timestamps, reply relationship, expiry, client message id, ratchet header, and ciphertext length. Messages are not padded, so length is visible. Link previews are not generated for encrypted DMs, because the server cannot see the links. Push notifications for those DMs cannot include the text, for the same reason.
The second copy
Multi-device is why stored history sits outside the ratchet's forward secrecy.
Ratchet state lives on one device. A message sealed only with the ratchet opens on that device. Every DM also carries a second ciphertext so another of your devices, and a later load of history, can open it. The key is an X25519 shared secret between the two accounts' long-lived DM identity keys, passed through HKDF with the info string rift-dm-static-fallback-v3. The server stores that ciphertext. On this page, the server cannot open it.
Forward secrecy covers the live session. Stored messages sit under the long-lived keys, so a compromised Rift Key, or a compromised DM identity key on any signed-in device, decrypts every stored message in both directions. One identity exists per account, not per device. Signing a device out ends its session. Keys that device already copied stay copied. Recovery changes the password and ends sessions. The DM keys come from the Rift Key, so they stay the same. If the Rift Key gets out, their instruction is to make a new account.
Signal's ratchet is built so a later key leak leaves earlier messages locked. This page's history copy is a static fallback so a second device can read the log. Until the afternoon of 3 October 2026 the features page said a later key leak leaves messages already sent locked. That sentence is gone. The heading now says Signal-style encryption for DM text, with history across devices, and that Rift does not hold the keys to read it. u/TheRiftChat wrote that the removed sentence had described an older design. The pages do not date that change.
Trust on first use, and the client they serve
Signature checks run against the account signing key the server gave the client. They say the server writes that key once and has no code path to replace it. The first time you talk to someone, you are trusting the server to hand you their real key. They say so. Safety numbers exist: a 60-digit fingerprint, and a verification flag. A contact you have not verified is trust on first use. There is no public key-transparency log. A compelled or compromised server, on their own description, can hand you the wrong key the first time.
Then the client:
The web and desktop clients load their code from our servers. End-to-end encryption in a browser is only as strong as the code the browser was served that day, and no design can fix that from inside the page.
Keys in the web and desktop apps sit in IndexedDB, wrapped by a non-extractable WebCrypto key that is also in IndexedDB. Any script running on the Rift origin can use that key. They say the wrapping stops a stolen browser profile from using the key. The Windows comparison page says the chat UI runs inside WebView2. The mobile apps and desktop installers are described as signed releases. The download page also offers an Android APK from the website.
Other limits they list
- The signed prekey is static for the life of the account. Re-uploading it does not change it. Signal rotates signed prekeys.
- If one-time prekeys run out, X3DH drops from four Diffie-Hellman operations to three. They call that standard, and weaker against a replayed handshake.
- Ciphertexts are not padded.
- Encrypted calls keep packet sizes that still vary with speech versus silence. They say they have not closed that.
- A compromised signed-in device holds the whole identity.
- The Rift Key is not stored unless you turn on an optional cache. The cache wraps it with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 at 600,000 iterations, or with a platform authenticator where the browser supports the WebAuthn PRF extension.
The "how to check any of this" section says the client code is not public. The checks they offer are: key-bundle endpoints return only public keys, encrypted DMs on the wire have the shape they describe, the server refuses an unsigned identity upload, and a data export lists counts of encrypted messages and none of the content. "If the code doesn't match this page, that's a security issue."
Terms and reports
The terms, September 2026, say you may not copy, decompile, reverse engineer, or scrape the service, and you may not use a modified or unofficial client. Automation of a user account is banned. Webhooks are the supported way to post without a person at the keyboard.
The security page, also September 2026, asks for reports by email, aims to acknowledge them within 72 hours, and offers a safe harbor for good-faith research that stays in scope and gives them time to fix. It says there is no formal bug bounty. The FAQ says audits are later, and that the check available now is to use the product and read the documents on the site.